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Attorneys for Amicus Curiae National Council of 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 The Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 allows certain 
agricultural producers to form cooperatives without incurring 
antitrust liability.  This appeal presents the novel question of 
whether a prejudgment order denying an agricultural 
cooperative the protections of the Capper-Volstead Act is 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.   
We hold it is not. 
I 
 In late 2000, a group of mushroom farmers and related 
entities, most of whom are located in southeastern 
Pennsylvania, formed the Eastern Mushroom Marketing 
Cooperative (EMMC).  The members of EMMC established 
minimum pricing policies and programs to improve their 
position in the market for raw, fresh mushrooms.  Pursuant to 
one such program, EMMC purchased properties (typically 
from bankrupt mushroom farmers) and resold them with deed 
restrictions that prohibited mushroom farming.  In 2003, the 
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) initiated an investigation of EMMC.  United States v. 
E. Mushroom Mktg. Coop., Inc., Civil Action No. 04-5829, 
2005 WL 3412413 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2005) (Mushroom I).  
Following its investigation, DOJ filed a Competitive Impact 
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Statement that concluded, inter alia, that EMMC was an 
agricultural cooperative organized pursuant to the Capper-
Volstead Act (the Act), 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-92.  In 2005, EMMC 
and DOJ entered into a consent judgment that required 
EMMC to nullify the deed restrictions on six parcels it had 
sold and prohibited it from placing restrictions on parcels sold 
within ten years.
1
  Mushroom I, 2005 WL 3412413. 
 Soon after the consent judgment was filed, various 
private parties brought their own antitrust suits against 
EMMC and its members.  In June 2006, the District Court 
consolidated seven class actions and one non-class action 
previously filed against EMMC and its members.  
Consequently, a group of mushroom purchasers, including 
mushroom wholesalers and large supermarkets (Purchasers), 
filed an amended antitrust class action against EMMC, thirty-
seven members, officers and affiliates of members, and 
unidentified members and/or co-conspirators (Growers), 
alleging a conspiracy in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act.  See 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1, 2, 18.  Unlike the DOJ action, this consolidated class 
action alleged antitrust violations involving both EMMC‟s 
                                                 
1
 The final judgment was “without trial or adjudication 
of any issue of fact or law,” Mushroom I, 2005 WL 3412413, 
at *1, and the Competitive  Impact Statement specified that 
“the Final Judgment has no prima facie effect in any 
subsequent lawsuits that may be brought against [EMMC,]” 
Competitive Impact Statement at 6, Mushroom I (No. 04-
5829), ECF No. 2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)).  Neither DOJ 
determination—that EMMC acted anticompetitively or that 
EMMC was a properly formed Capper-Volstead 
cooperative—is binding upon the District Court or this Court. 
 12 
 
property purchase program and its minimum pricing policies.  
Although the specifics of the Purchasers‟ complaint are not 
germane to our decision regarding the jurisdictional question, 
the District Court‟s summary provides useful background 
information.  The Purchasers alleged that the Growers  
launched a “supply control” campaign by using 
membership funds [from EMMC] collected 
during 2001 and 2002 to acquire and 
subsequently dismantle non-EMMC mushroom 
growing operations in order to support and 
maintain artificial price increases.  [The 
Purchasers] allege that the EMMC repeatedly 
would purchase a mushroom farm or a parcel of 
farmland and then sell or exchange that farm or 
parcel at a loss, attaching a permanent or long-
term deed restriction to the land prohibiting the 
conduct of any business related to the growing 
of mushrooms. . . . 
[The Purchasers] further allege that [the 
Growers] collectively interfered with non-
EMMC growers that sought to sell at prices 
below those set by the EMMC and pressured 
independent growers to join the EMMC.  The 
pressure and coercion tactics alleged include 
threatening and/or implementing a group 
boycott in which EMMC members would not 
sell mushrooms to assist independent growers 
in satisfying their short-term supply needs 
and/or selling mushrooms to independent 
growers at inflated prices.  
 13 
 
In re Mushroom Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 621 F. 
Supp. 2d 274, 279 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (Mushroom II). 
 The District Court, after ruling on the Growers‟ 
motions to dismiss, bifurcated discovery and entertained 
cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the 
preliminary question of whether the Growers were exempt 
from the antitrust claims under the Capper-Volstead Act.  The 
Court denied the Growers‟ motion and granted the 
Purchasers‟ motion, holding that EMMC was not a proper 
agricultural cooperative under the Capper-Volstead Act 
because one member, M. Cutone Mushroom Co., Inc., was 
not technically a grower of agricultural produce.  Id. at 286.  
The District Court further opined that “[e]ven if all EMMC 
members satisfied the requirements to qualify the cooperative 
for the Capper-Volstead exemption, the exemption does not 
extend to protect cooperatives that conspire with non-
cooperatives,” and it found that the uncontested facts of the 
case revealed an impermissible price-fixing conspiracy with a 
non-member mushroom distribution company.  Id. at 286-91.
2
  
                                                 
2
 Because we hold that we do not have jurisdiction to 
hear this question on interlocutory appeal, we do not opine on 
the validity of the District Court‟s holding that EMMC was 
not properly formed under the Capper-Volstead Act because 
one of its members was not a grower of agricultural produce.  
Mushroom II, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 286 n.13 (“I have found that 
the EMMC is not exempt under Capper-Volstead by 
including M. Cutone [Mushroom Co., Inc.] as a member 
when it is not a grower . . . .”).  We do note that, despite a 
host of arguments pressed by the Purchasers in the court 
below and on appeal, the ineligibility of M. Cutone was the 
only basis for that holding.  Id. (explaining that, having found 
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In response to the District Court‟s holding, the Growers filed 
this appeal.  The Purchasers moved to dismiss, claiming that 
we lack jurisdiction to hear this case as an interlocutory 
appeal.
3
 
II 
 “We necessarily exercise de novo review over an 
argument alleging a lack of appellate jurisdiction.”  Montanez 
v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010).  We have 
“jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district 
courts of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis 
added).  Despite this final order requirement, the collateral 
order doctrine permits courts of appeals to hear interlocutory 
appeals from “a small set of prejudgment orders that are 
„collateral to‟ the merits of an action and „too important‟ to be 
denied immediate review.”  Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Cohen v. 
                                                                                                             
that one member of EMMC was not a grower, the District 
Court need not extend its analysis to the Purchasers‟ other 
allegations).  Nor do we opine on the validity of the 
alternative holding in the second half of the District Court‟s 
opinion, which concerns a different question, whether 
particular anticompetitive conduct by EMMC would be 
covered by the Act‟s exemption if it did apply.  Id. at 286-91. 
 
3
 The Mushroom Cooperative Defendants (EMMC and 
28 companies and individuals) appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291, at case number 09-2257.  M.D. Basciani & Sons, Inc. 
appealed separately under § 1291, at case number 09-2258.  
The appeals were consolidated and we refer to all appellants 
as Appellants or Growers. 
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Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).  We 
must decide whether an order denying the protections of the 
Capper-Volstead Act falls within that “small set of 
prejudgment orders.” 
 In Cohen, the Supreme Court established three 
prerequisites to the application of the collateral order 
doctrine.  Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.  “[A] district court‟s order 
must 1) conclusively determine the disputed question; 2) 
resolve an important issue completely separate from the 
merits of the action; and 3) be effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.”  Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 
F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978); Cohen, 337 U.S. at 
546). 
 The first requirement of the Cohen test is easily 
satisfied because the District Court‟s order conclusively 
determined the issue of the Growers‟ protection under the 
Capper-Volstead Act.  Whether the second requirement is met 
is less clear because, while a “claim of immunity is 
conceptually distinct from the merits of the plaintiff‟s claim 
that his rights have been violated,” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 527-28 (1985), the alternative holding in the latter 
half of the District Court‟s opinion includes findings 
regarding a price-fixing conspiracy that are closely related to 
the merits of the Purchasers‟ antitrust claims.  We need not 
resolve that question, however, because we hold that an order 
denying a defendant the Capper-Volstead Act‟s protections is 
not effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment 
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and therefore does not satisfy the third requirement of the 
Cohen test.
4
 
A 
 We begin with the Supreme Court‟s most recent 
decision involving the collateral order doctrine.  In holding 
that disclosure orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege 
are not immediately appealable, the Court wrote: 
 The justification for immediate appeal 
must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the 
usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation 
concludes.  This requirement finds expression 
in two of the three traditional Cohen conditions.  
The second condition insists upon important 
questions separate from the merits.  More 
significantly, the third Cohen question, whether 
a right is adequately vindicable or effectively 
reviewable, simply cannot be answered without 
a judgment about the value of the interests that 
would be lost through rigorous application of a 
final judgment requirement.  That a ruling may 
burden litigants in ways that are only 
imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a 
final district court judgment . . . has never 
                                                 
4
 The appeal must also present a “„serious and 
unsettled‟” legal question.  Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 
1454, 1459 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 
U.S. 731, 742 (1982)).  There is no dispute that the question, 
whether the arguably inadvertent inclusion of an ineligible 
member strips an agricultural cooperative of Capper-Volstead 
protection, is both serious and unsettled. 
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sufficed.  Instead, the decisive consideration is 
whether delaying review until the entry of final 
judgment would imperil a substantial public 
interest or some particular value of a high order. 
 In making this determination, we do not 
engage in an individualized jurisdictional 
inquiry.  Rather, our focus is on the entire 
category to which a claim belongs.  As long as 
the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be 
adequately vindicated by other means, the 
chance that the litigation at hand might be 
speeded, or a particular injustic[e] averted, does 
not provide a basis for jurisdiction under § 
1291. 
Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 605-06 (alteration and second 
omission in original) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 One category of prejudgment order that long has been 
recognized as giving rise to an interlocutory appeal is an 
order denying a defendant immunity from suit; such a denial 
is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment” 
in that an erroneous denial exposes the defendant to the 
burden of litigation, thwarting the purpose of the immunity.  
In Mitchell v. Forsyth, the Supreme Court expanded Cohen 
and held that denials of qualified immunity are collateral 
orders because an “essential attribute [of absolute and 
qualified immunity is] an entitlement not to stand trial under 
certain circumstances,” and qualified immunity is “an 
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”  
472 U.S. at 525-26, 530.  Other immunities from suit have 
since been recognized, and orders denying those immunities 
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are also immediately appealable under the collateral order 
doctrine.  P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 
Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (holding that Eleventh 
Amendment sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, 
the denial of which is appealable as a collateral order); Oss 
Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 760-
61 (3d Cir. 2010) (International Organizations Immunities 
Act); Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(prosecutorial immunity); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & 
Co., Inc., 12 F.3d 1270, 1281 (3d Cir. 1993) (Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act). 
B 
 In support of their argument that we have jurisdiction 
over this appeal, the Growers cite Mitchell v. Forsyth for the 
proposition that “orders deciding assertions of immunity 
generally qualify for immediate appeal.”  Mushroom Coop. 
Appellants‟ Br. at 56. 
  No court of appeals has addressed whether the 
Capper-Volstead Act provides an immunity from suit, but we 
considered an analogous question in We, Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 1999).  There, we 
held that a denial of immunity under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine is not an immediately appealable collateral order.  
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides an “immunity” from 
antitrust laws for “[j]oint efforts to influence public officials . 
. . even though intended to eliminate competition.”  United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965); see 
E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 
365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).  As we explained in We, Inc., this 
immunity is predicated on two principles: the First 
Amendment right to petition the government, and the 
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language of the Sherman Act indicating that Congress did not 
intend it to restrict the political process.  We, Inc., 174 F.3d at 
326.  Thus, we concluded that “a right not to be burdened 
with a trial is simply not an aspect of [Noerr-Pennington] 
protection.”  Id. at 330.  Mindful of this analogy—and of the 
differences between the judicially-created Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine and the Capper-Volstead Act—we turn to the 
language of the Act and the Supreme Court cases interpreting 
it. 
 The Capper-Volstead Act provides an exemption from 
some of the antitrust prohibitions of the Sherman Act and the 
Clayton Antitrust Act.  The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, 
criminalizes certain anticompetitive business practices.
5
  The 
Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, creates a private right of action 
                                                 
 
5
 The Sherman Act provides, in relevant part: 
 
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; 
penalty 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . .  
 
§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty 
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony . . . . 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2. 
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for violations of the Sherman Act.  15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26.  “In 
the early 1900‟s, when agricultural cooperatives were 
growing in effectiveness, there was widespread concern 
because the mere organization of farmers for mutual help was 
often considered to be a violation of the antitrust laws.”  Md. 
& Va. Milk Producers Ass’n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 
464 (1960).  This concern led to the passage of section 6 of 
the Clayton Act
6
 and eventually the Capper-Volstead Act in 
1922.  Id. at 464-66.  The Capper-Volstead Act provides, in 
relevant part: 
                                                 
6
 Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:  
 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity 
or article of commerce.  Nothing contained in 
the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid 
the existence and operation of labor, 
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, 
instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and 
not having capital stock or conducted for profit, 
or to forbid or restrain individual members of 
such organizations from lawfully carrying out 
the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such 
organizations, or the members thereof, be held 
or construed to be illegal combinations or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the 
antitrust laws. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 17.  The Capper-Volstead Act extended these 
protections to agricultural cooperatives having capital stock. 
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Persons engaged in the production of 
agricultural products as farmers, planters, 
ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may 
act together in associations, corporate or 
otherwise, with or without capital stock, in 
collectively processing, preparing for market, 
handling, and marketing in interstate and 
foreign commerce, such products of persons so 
engaged. Such associations may have marketing 
agencies in common; and such associations and 
their members may make the necessary 
contracts and agreements to effect such 
purposes: Provided, however, That such 
associations are operated for the mutual benefit 
of the members thereof, as such producers, and 
conform to one or both of [certain] 
requirements . . . . 
7 U.S.C. § 291.  Thus, the Capper-Volstead Act exempts 
certain agricultural cooperatives from some of the provisions 
of the antitrust laws, allowing farmers to act through 
agricultural cooperatives with “the same unified competitive 
advantage—and responsibility—available to businessmen 
acting through corporations as entities.”  Md. & Va. Milk 
Producers, 362 U.S. at 466; see also Nat’l Broiler Mktg. 
Ass’n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 822 (1978).  
Significantly for our purposes, the Act does not explicitly 
state whether the immunity it provides is one from suit or one 
from liability. 
 The Supreme Court‟s descriptions of the protections 
afforded by the Capper-Volstead Act inform our decision 
regarding whether it provides an immunity from suit.  
According to the Court, the Act does not “wholly . . . exempt 
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agricultural associations from the antitrust laws” because, 
although it permits the creation of cooperatives, it does “not 
leave co-operatives free to engage in practices against other 
persons in order to monopolize trade, or restrain and suppress 
competition with the cooperative.”  Md. & Va. Milk 
Producers, 362 U.S. at 463-68; see United States v. Borden 
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 204-05 (1939) (“The right of these 
agricultural producers thus to unite in preparing for market 
and marketing their products, and to make the contracts 
which are necessary for that collaboration, cannot be deemed 
to authorize any combination or conspiracy with other 
persons in restraint of trade that these producers may see fit to 
devise.”); cf. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith 
Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1962) (holding that 
the individual members of the Sunkist-related cooperatives 
cannot be held to have conspired with one another in restraint 
of trade).
7
 
 The Growers correctly note that the Supreme Court 
has occasionally referred to the Act as granting “immunity.”  
But that “immunity” is properly understood as an immunity 
from liability or from prosecution by the government, not an 
immunity from civil suit.  See Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist 
                                                 
7
 We have characterized the function of the Act the 
same way: “the Capper-Volstead Act permits producers of 
agricultural products—including milk, mushrooms and 
others—to enter into manufacturing and marketing 
cooperatives without fear of violating antitrust laws.”  
Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 273 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted), vacated on other 
grounds, Lovell v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 1058 (2005). 
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Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384, 397 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to 
“immunity from liability under . . . the Sherman Act”); 
Sunkist Growers v. Winckler, 370 U.S. at 27-28 (“Section 6 of 
the Clayton Act provides, inter alia, that agricultural 
organizations instituted for the purposes of mutual help shall 
not be held or construed to be illegal combinations or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.  The 
Capper-Volstead Act sets out this immunity in greater 
specificity . . . .”); Md. & Va. Milk Producers, 362 U.S. at 
463-64 (referring to “immunity from prosecution” and 
Congress‟s intent to “immunize . . . from prosecution”) (all 
emphases added).
8
 
* * * 
                                                 
8
 The Growers argue that the Act‟s legislative history 
indicates Congress‟s intent to immunize farmers from suit.  
But the legislative history focuses on government 
prosecution, not private suits.  See 62 CONG. REC. 2059 
(1922) (“[I]t seems evident that Congress intends that the 
farmer shall not be prosecuted for acting collectively in the 
marketing of his product.”).  Although Senator Capper made 
comments about protecting the American farmer from 
“persecution by interests opposing him if he seeks to act 
collectively through cooperative associations,” id. (remarks of 
Sen. Capper), there is no indication that such “persecution” 
includes the threat of private litigation.  Furthermore, it would 
be unreasonable to infer a Congressional intent to relieve 
farmers entirely of the threat of suit, given the limited nature 
of the exemption discussed above, which does not shield 
them completely from the burdens of antitrust litigation. 
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 Neither the language of the Capper-Volstead Act nor 
Supreme Court cases interpreting it indicate that the Act 
entitles an agricultural cooperative to avoid entirely the 
burden of litigation.  Because the Act does not provide an 
immunity from suit, a district court order denying a defendant 
its protections is not effectively unreviewable after final 
judgment, and, therefore, is not a collateral order subject to 
interlocutory review.  Accordingly, we will dismiss this 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
